Read it carefully and note the date. Read it again and again..then pass it on. It has this paragraph:
"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now
seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justifi ed by the conjunction of ter-
rorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fi xed around the policy. The NSC had no patience
with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record."
---the intelligence and facts were fixed around the policy.
I wonder how this got out into the open?? Why did it take so long?
Well, here you go....
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
The Secret Downing Street Memo
-----
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Rich-
ards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER’S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a
genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam’s regime was tough and based on
extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried
and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or over-
whelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale
was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now
seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justifi ed by the conjunction of ter-
rorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fi xed around the policy. The NSC had no patience
with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little
discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4
August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to
Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus
belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option.
Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement
were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
2
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering
from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun “spikes of activity” to put pressure on the regime.
No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was
January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had
made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam
was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.
We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would
also help with the legal justifi cation for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were
three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The fi rst and second
could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be diffi cult. The situation
might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in
the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was produc-
ing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right,
people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether
we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the fi rst, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing
to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse
and urban warfi ghting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added
the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a
winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play
hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of mili-
tary action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to
decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It
would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a
fuller picture of US planning before we could take any fi rm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we
were considering a range of options.
3
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this
operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contri-
butions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly
work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and
of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal
advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
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