Tom Hayes: What would the Founding Fathers make of politics on Facebook?

It's clear that collectively the political activists supporting Barack Obama's campaign got used to knowing - or thinking they knew - what was going on with the campaign. Reading David Plouffe's book might open a few eyes to the reality, which was anything but glamorous in his account.

Obama laid his cards on the table, as many documented during the campaign, and managed to make the election a referendum on his agenda despite the best efforts of his opponents to make it a vote on his "not like me-ness." Of course, the reasons for voting for him were diverse -- hence it was a coalition that put him into office based on a wide variety of individual beliefs and convictions about what it was possible to improve in D.C.

Some supporters (and many detractors,) for instance, failed to listen closely to his intentions for Afghanistan, choosing to assume his statements about being against "dumb wars" in general and Iraq in particular meant he'd back out of any situation overseas where bullets and bombs are flying.

It's disconcerting to others to realize that increasing the transparency of the government, which Obama also advocated, isn't exactly tantamount to inviting activists and reporters into the negotiating sessions necessitated by the arcane rules and strictures of the Congress. 

Most (not all) political activists on both sides of the major issues know that progress is fundamentally based on compromise(s) to achieve what is possible, no matter if it's making decisions in the local school PTA or the U.S. Senate.  Compromises acceptable to the majority by definition almost always fall short of the ideals of those with the strongest convictions.

Unlike the PTA, which is pretty much open to all comers, the U.S. Congress reaches compromise by a not-terribly-pretty process involving just over 500 powerful, influential, sometimes self-serving people expected to do right by the entire country while being inundated with conflicting suggestions. Expecting to see inside that process is a bit - well - idealistic for those sitting at home or working for the media, even if that is what they thought they had bargained for in electing the new President.

That's not how a Democratic Republic works. We don't hold referendums on every issue; we elect folks who seem to hold similar ideals to us and hope they manage to accomplish exactly what we want them to. That's why it's so easy to predict that polls almost always reflect the popularity of a President as in decline - at any given point in time politicians are working on decisions bound to challenge our "collective" opinion precisely because we charge them with handling the hardest and most important decisions.

Now, to balance out the curiously persistent tea baggers who apparently favor a system based on government as minimal and ineffectual as the one in Somalia, some of the hundreds of millions on Facebook are banding together on a "fan page" supporting President Obama, and not second-guessing him. The Founding Fathers must surely be smiling.

Thomas Hayes is an entrepreneur, journalist, and political analyst who contributes regularly to a host of web sites on topics ranging from economics and politics to culture and community.

Iraqi reporter throws shoes at Bush, calls him dog TPM: News Pages | Talking Points Memo |

TPM: News Pages | Talking Points Memo | Iraqi reporter throws shoes at Bush, calls him dog: “BAGHDAD, Dec 14 (Reuters) - An Iraqi reporter called visiting U.S. President George W. Bush a "dog" in Arabic on Sunday and threw his shoes at him during a news conference in Baghdad.

Iraqi security officers and U.S. secret service agents leapt at the man and dragged him struggling and screaming out of the room where Bush was giving a news conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.

The shoes missed their target about 15 feet (4.5 metres) away. One sailed over Bush's head as he stood next to Maliki and smacked into the wall behind him. Bush smiled uncomfortably and Maliki looked strained.

"It doesn't bother me," Bush said, urging everyone to calm down as a ruckus broke out in the conference room.

When asked about the incident shortly after, Bush made light of it. "I didn't feel the least threatened by it," he said.”

John McCain Believes Iraq Had Weapons Of Mass Destruction They Never Had

Yikes! Senator John McCain is really out of it. He now says that had Sadamm Hussein never been captured, he would have used his weapons of mass destruction. McCain also asserts that the high price of oil justifies the Iraq War.

But here's the kicker: there were never any weapons of mass destruction.

McCain thinks Americans are stupid. Either that, or he is himself.

John McCain's San Francisco Visit To Be Met With Protests Today

Senator John McCain has a big-ticket fundraiser of 100,000 per person and held at the Fairmount Hotel to add to the public money he's already using to run for President.

I figured an anti-war protest must have been planned and I was right: there's one according to KTYU.com:

SAN FRANCISCO -- Grassroots campaigners are planning to protest the continuation of the Iraq war Monday outside a fundraising event at a San Francisco hotel for Republican presidential nominee Arizona Sen. John McCain.

Members of No Soldier Left Behind will rally outside the campaign fundraiser and collect petition signatures calling for a responsible end to the war, according to Peace Action West, an organization that fosters civic activism. Protestors will hold signs advocating the end of the war and well being of Iraqis and Americans in the region.

"Sen. McCain is here raising money in support of an Iraq policy that will be a continuation of the president's fail strategy," Peace Action West's Executive Director Jon Rainwater said. "Americans and Iraqis can't afford four more years of mistakes, so we are insisting that the next president bring a responsible end to the war in their first year."

The protestors will assemble in front of the Fairmont hotel at 6:30 p.m.

Tom Hayden Questions Obama's Afghanistan Plan As He Sees It

In The Nation, Tom Hayden questions Senator Barack Obama's strategy -- or as he understands it -- to shift troops from Iraq to Afghanistan.

Hayden's point is that the country is so unstable that we may be going from the frying pay to the fire. I agree.

But I don't think that Obama's plan is to recreate our Bush-style Iraq situation in Afghanistan.

At any rate, it's worth checking out.

Agent Trick In Columbia Could Have Been Used To Get Saddam

I happened on this CNN website news headline reporting that the agents who rescued the Columbia hostages used "old-fashioned trickery" by pretending to be part of the FARC, then leading the band to safety, rather than where the hostages thought they were going, to meet international leaders.

That's fantastic. But my question is why could we not have done that in Iraq? I've long believed we didn't need to have a big military effort to do this; that we could send people to embed into the culture and work their way in.

In my view, the effort of the Columbian rescuers gives yet another reason why we should not have invaded Iraq, let alone started the Iraq War we're still in.

Iraq War: If The Surge Is Working, Bring The Troops Home!

I just ran over this Washington Post article which reports that the "surge" is working, but the Bush Administration does not have a plan for the period after the surge.

It's as if they were expecting to just keep the troops there, lending credence to Senator John McCain's view that we're going to be i n Iraq for 100 years.

I can only hope we get Senator Obama into the White House as President. While Iraq forces may not be able to act independently of American forces, perhaps they would be left with no choice if we took the lion's share of the troops out.

The Downing Street Memo Meat Of Dennis Kucinich's Call For Impeachment:

"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now
seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justifi ed by the conjunction of ter-
rorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fi xed around the policy. The NSC had no patience
with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record."

That was from my blog dated June 5, 2005 -- three years ago. I thought that was shocking then, but what's even more disturbing is the totally retarded view of people like Fox News Bill O'Reilly, who says that it doens't matter how we got into war, we're winning it!

That's so stupid it's mental. Really. It is. I'm not going to waste time on Bill here. At least more than I already have done.

The main point is that the first paragraph forms the basis for the explaination of actions by President Bush since 2002 that have resulted in a 35-count call for impeachment by Congressman Dennis Kucinich. Many have looked at his case, including Beth Holzman at the Huff Post, who writes..

Some will want to dismiss Rep. Dennis Kucinich's introduction of articles of impeachment against President Bush as quixotic, but it's not. Twenty House Republicans joined nearly all House Democrats in voting to send the articles to the Judiciary Committee. This comes on the heels of the Senate Intelligence Committee's 107-page report confirming, with the vote of two Republican Senators, that President Bush abused his office by deceiving Congress and the American people into the Iraq war. Although Kucinich's articles included other impeachment grounds as well, deception about the war is arguably the most serious one.

And a forgotten one.

The Downing Street Memo was the smoking gun in 2005, and it still is today. In fact, the memo that pointed to the U.S. desire to circumvent the United Nations and fashion a case for war, is actually several memos. Moreover, I vividly remember that when this issue of the Downing Street Memo came up, the mainstream media all but swept it under the rug.

This includes the same White House Press Corp that now is upset with President Bush's former Press Secretary Scott McClellan's new book which also reveals a strategy to cover up and form a bogus intelligence argument for going to war. The same one such that CNN's Jessica Yellin said that when she worked for ABC, she was "forced" to make reports that were favorable to the Bush Administration. And the same White House Press Corp which has Fox News reporters who Rupert Murdock admitted at the Davos Forum, were part of Fox' effort to "sell" the war to the public -- to "follow the Bush Policy" as he says in this damaging video:




We knew then -- or Bush knew -- that there were no WMD's at all. But that was the basis for going to war in Iraq.

The main Downing Street Memo was written by Matthew Rycroft, who was at the time a Downing Street foreign policy aide as of 2006, he is the Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The memo, according to Wikipedia, was leaked to The Sunday Times on May 1, 2005.

I first learned about it reading the Drudge Report. I can't remember ABC, CBS, or NBC featuring the story on a consistent basis. It came and went. Now, it's back. Here's the first memo, read it carefully and more than once.

This second memo I've selected from the set was dated March 8, 2002 and reads the UK's view on Iraq, stating that they believed that there were "WMD's" but did not have the sound intelligence to back their claim. The memo states that the U.S. was pushing for "regime" change and felt that U.S. Containment Policy was not working. But the memo reveals that it was indeed effective and had outlines for tightening the policy.

(Supporters of Senator Obama should pay attention as the seeds for a more diplomatic approach are here. The Second Bush Administration really just wanted to use 9-11 as a reason to find and jail Saddam Hussein, in my view. But once that was done, we should have just got out and came home.

Here's the second memo:

Text of the Iraq Options paper - March 8, 2002 memo from Overseas and Defence Secretariat Cabinet Office outlining military options for implementing regime change.

(to print in large text reliably, increase the text size view in your browser, the text will then print larger as well)

[begin transcription]

SECRET UK EYES ONLY

IRAQ: OPTIONS PAPER

SUMMARY

Since 1991, our objective has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbors, into the international community. Implicitly, this cannot occur with Saddam Hussein in power. As at least worst opinion, we have supported a policy of containment which has been partially successful. However:

* Despite sanctions, Iraq continues to develop WMD,. although our intelligence is poor. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened, though there is no greater threat now than in recent years that Saddam will use WMD; and
* Saddam’s brutal regime remains in power and destablises the Arab and wider Islamic world.

We have two options. We could toughen the existing containment policy. This would increase the pressure on Saddanm [sic]. It would not reintegrate Iraq into the international community.

The US administration has lot faith in containment and is now considering regime change. The end states could either be a Sunni strongman or a representative government.

Tre [sic] three options for achieving regime change are:

* covert support to opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup;
* air support for opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup; and
* a full-scale ground campaign.

These are not mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural precursors to Option3 [sic]. the greater investment of Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the greater the cost and the longer we woul [sic] need to stay. the only certain means to remove Saddam and his elite is to invade and impose a new government. But this could involve nation building over many years. Even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD and build-up its conventional forces, so long a Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional armouries and there was no acceptable solution to Palestinian grievances.

A legal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers advice, non currently exists. This makes moving quickly to invade legally very difficult. We should therefore consider a staged approach, establishing international support, building up pressure on Saddam and developing military plans. There is a lead time of about 6 months to a ground offensive.

CURRENT OBJECTIVES OF UK POLICY

1 Within our objectives of preserving peace and stability in the Gulf and ensuring energy security, our current objectives towards Iraq are:
* the reintegration of a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbours, into the international community. Implicitly this cannot occur with Saddam in power; and
* hence, as the least worst option, we have supported containment of Iraq, by constraining Saddam’s ability to re-arm or build up WMD and to threaten his neighbours.

2 Subsidiary objectives are:
* Preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq;
* improving the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people;
* protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq;
*sustaining UK/UK co-operation, including, if necessary by moderating US policy; and
* maintaining the credibility and authority of the Security Council.

HAS CONTAINMENT WORKED?

3 Since 1991, the policy of containment has been partially successful;
* Sanctions have effectively frozen Iraq’s nuclear programme;
* Iraq has been prevented from rebuilding its conventional arsenal to pre-Gulf War levels;
* ballistic missile programmes have been severely restricted;
Biological weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes have been hindered;
* No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq have given some protection to the Kurds and the Shia. Although subject to continuing political pressure, the Kurds remain autonomous; and
* Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his neighbours.

4 However:
* Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, although our intelligence is poor. Iraq has up to 20 650km-range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit os 150km continues. Iraq continues with the BW and CW programmed and, if it has not already done so could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including is ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened.
* Saddam leads a brutal regime, which impoverishes his people. While in power Saddam is a rallying point for anti-Western sentiment in the Arab and wider Islamic world, and as such a cause of instability; and
* despite UN controls over Iraq’s oil revenue under Oil for Food, there is considerable oil and other smuggling.

5 In this context, and against the background of our desire to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq into the international community, we examine the two following policy options:
* a toughening of the existing containment policy, facilitate by 11 September; and
* regime change by military means: a new departure which would require the construction of a coalition and a legal justification.

TOUGHENING CONTAINMENT

6 This would consist of the following elements:
* full implementation of all relevant UNSCRs, particularly 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999). We should ensure that the Good Review List (GRL) is introduced in May and that Russian holds to its promise not to block. The signs are positive but continuing pressure is needed. (The GRL focuses sanctions exclusively on preventing shipments of WMD-related and other arms, while allowing other business without scrutiny. As such, it will greatly facilitate legitimate Iraqi commerce under Oil for Food.);
* encourage the US not to block discussions to clarify the modalities of Resolution 1284 once Russian agreement to the GRL has been secured. We should take a hard-line on each area for clarification - the purpose of clarification is not to lower the bar on Iraqi compliance; but
* P5 and Security Council unity would facilitate a specific demand that Iraq re-admit the UN inspectors. Our aim would be to tell Saddam to admit inspectors or face the risk of military action.
* push for tougher action (especially by the US) against states breaking sanctions. This should not discriminate between allies (Turkey), friends (UAE) and others (especially Syria). It would put real pressure on Saddam either to submit to meaningful inspections or to lash out;
* maintain our present military posture, including in the NFZs, and be prepared to respond robustly to any Iraqi adventurism; and
* continue to make clear (without overtly espousing regime change) our view that Iraq would be better off without Saddam. We could trail the rosy future for Iraq without him in a ‘Con tract with the Iraqi People’, although to be at all credible, this would need some detailed work.

7 What could it achieve:
* There will be greater pressure on Saddam. The GRL will make sanctions more attractive to at least some of their detractors. Improving implementation of sanctions would reduce the regime’s illicit revenues; and
* the return of UN weapons inspectors would allow greater scrutiny of Iraqi programmes and of Iraqi forces in general. If they found significant evidence of WMD, were expelled or, in face of an ultimatum, not re-admitted in the first place, then this could provide legal justification for large-scale military action (see below).

8 But:
* Some of the difficulties with the existing policy still apply;
those states in breach of sanctions will want compensation if they are to change ge tack;
* Saddam is only likely to permit the return of inspectors if he believes the threat of large scale US military action is imminent and that such concessions would prevent the US from acting decisively. Playing for time, he would then embark on a renewed policy of non co-operation; and
* although containment has held for the past decade, Iraq has progressively increased it international engagement. Even if the GRL makes sanctions more sustainable the sanctions regime could collapse in the long-term.

9 Tougher containment would not re-integrate Iraq into the international community as it offers little prospect of removing Saddam. He will continue with his WMD programmes, destabilising the ARab and Islamic world, and impoverishing his people. But there is no greater threat no that he will use WMD than there has been in recent years, so continuing containment is an option.

US VIEWS

10 The US has lost confidence in containment. Some in government want Saddam removed. The success of Operation Enduring Freedom, distrust of UN sanctions and inspection regimes, and unfinished business from 1991 are all factors. Washington believes the legal basis for an attack on Iraq already exists. Nor will it necessarily be governed by wider political factors. The US may be willing to work with a much smaller coalition than we think desirable.

REGIME CHANGE

11 In considering the options for regime change below, we need to first consider what sort of Iraq we want? There are two possibilities:
* A Sunni military strongman. He would be likely to maintain Iraqi territorial integrity. Assistance with reconstruction and political rehabilitation could be traded for assurances on abandoning WMD programmes and respecting human rights, particularly of ethnic minorities. The US and other militaries could withdraw quickly. However, there would then be a strong risk of the Iraqi system reverting to type. Military coup could succeed coup until an autocratic, Sunni dictator emerged who protected Sunni interests. With time he could acquire WMD; or
* a representative broadly democratic government. This would be Sunni-led but within a federal structure, the Kurds would be guaranteed autonomy and the Shia fair access to government. Such a regime would be less likely to develop WMD and threaten its neighbours. However, to survive it would require the US and others to commit to nation building for many years. This wold entail a substantial international security force and help with reconstruction

OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER: INTERNAL

12 Saddam has a strong grip on power maintained through fear and patronage. The security and intelligence apparatus, including the Republican and Special Republican Guard, who protect the regime to effectively are predominantly drawn from the Arab Sunni minority (2-25 per cent of the population); many from Tikrit like Saddam. They fear non-Sunni rule, which would bring retribution and the end of their privileges. The regime’s success in defeating the 1991 uprising stemmed from senior Sunni officers looking into the abyss of Shia rule and preserving their interests by backing Saddam. In the current circumstances, a military revolt or coup is a remote possibility.

13 Unaided, the Iraqi opposition is incapable of overthrowing the regime. The external opposition is weak, divided and lacks domestic credibility. The predominant group is the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella organisation led by Ahmad Chalabi, a Shia and convicted fraudster, popular on Capitol Hill. The other major group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), espouses moderate Arab socialism and is led by another Shia, Ayad Allawi. Neither group has a military capability and both are badly penetrated by Iraqi intelligence. In 1996, a CIA attempt to stir opposition groups ended in wholesale executions. Most Iraqis see the INC/INA as Western stooges.

14 The internal opposition is small and fractured on ethnic and sectarian grounds. There is no effective Sunni Arab opposition. There are 3-4m in northern Iraq. Most live in Kurdish Autonomous Zone, established in 1991. The Kurds deploy at least 40,000 lightly armed militia but are divided between two main parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). These groups have an interest in preserving the status quo and are more interested in seeking advantage over the other than allying against Saddam. Divide and rule is easy; in 196 the KDP assisted the Iraqi Army’s expulsion of the PUK and Iraqi opposition groups from Irbil.

15 The Kurds do not co-operate with the Shia Arabs who form 60 per cent of the population. The main Shia opposition group is the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), with 3-5,000 fighters, but it is tainted by Iranian support. Most Shia would like to have a greater say in Iraqi government, but not necessarily control: they do no want secession, Islamic autonomy or Iranian influence.

REGIONAL

16 Iraq’s neighbours have a direct interest in the country’s affairs. Iran and Turkey, in particular, are wary of US influence and oppose some opposition groups. Turkey, conscious of its own restive Kurdish minority, will do anything to prevent the establishment of a independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, including intervention. Iran, also with a Kurdish minority, would also oppose a Kurdish state and is keen to protect the rights of its co-religionists in the south (see FCO paper on P5, European and regional view of possible military action against Iraq, attached.)

17 We have looked at three options for achieving regime change (we dismissed assassination of Saddam Hussein as an option because it would be illegal):

OPTION 1: COVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS

18 The aim would be to bring down the regime byinternal [sic] revolt, aided by the defection or at least acquiescence of large sections of the Army. A group of Sunni generals probably from within the Republican Guard, might depose Saddam if they decided the alternative was defeat. This option could be pursued by providing covert intelligence, large scale financial and Special Forces support to opposition groups. The Kurds would be persuaded to unite and attack into northern Iraq, tying down some Iraqi forces. Simultaneously, in a greater threat to the regime, the Shia would rise up in the southern cities, and in Baghdad.

19 This option also has a very low prospect of success on its own. The external opposition is no strong enough to overthrow Saddam and would be rejected by most Iraqis as a replacement government. The Kurds could only mount a very limited offensive in the north. Mass uprisings in the south would be unlikely. The US failure to support the 1991 uprising remains vivid. The Republican Guard would move against any opposition and any wavering regular Army units. There would also be a high risk of US/coalition forces being captured. The remaining elements of opposition could be eliminated, buttressing Saddam and his reputation as Arab folk hero. On the other hand, this option has never been pursued in a concerted, single-minded way before and should not be dismissed, at least as a possible precursor to Options 2 and 3.

OPTION 2: AN AIR CAMPAIGN PROVIDING OVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS LEADING TO A COUP OR UPRISING

20 The aim would be to assist an internal revolt by providing strategic and tactical air support for opposition groups to move against the regime. Such support would disable Saddam’s military and security apparatus. Suspected WMD facilities would also be targeted. Substantial numbers of aircraft and munitions would need to be built up in threatre over a period of months. Any campaign would take several weeks at least probably several months. Pressure on the regime could be increased by massing ground and naval forces and threatening a land invasion.

21 This option has no guarantee of success. The build up of pressure might persuade other Sunnis to overthrow Saddam and his family, but there is no guarantee that another Sunni autocrat would be better. Comparisons with Afghanistan are misleading. Saddam’s military and security apparatus is considerable more potent and cohesive. We are not aware of any Karzai figure able to command respect inside and outside Iraq. Arab states would only back the plan if they were sure Saddam would be deposed. At least the co-operation of Kuwait would be needed for the necessary military build-up. The Arab street would oppose an air attack against Iraq, but visibility of a popular uprising could calm Arab public opinion.

OPTION 3: A GROUND CAMPAIGN

22 The aim would be to launch a full-scale ground offensive to destroy Saddam]s [sic] military machine and remove him from power. A pro-Western regime would be installed which would destroy Iraq’s WMD capability, make peace with Iraq’s neighbours and give rights to all Iraqis, including ethnic minorities. As in the Gulf War, this would need to be preceded by a major air-offensive to soften up defences.

23 US contingency planning prior to 11 September indicated that such a ground campaign would require 200-400,000 troops. The numbers would be roughly half those of 1991 because Iraqi forces are now considerably weaker. Any invasion force would need to pose a credible threat to Baghdad in order to persuade members of the Sunni military elite that their survival was better served by deserting to the coalition than staying loyal to Saddam. Sufficient air assets would need three months and ground forces at least four-five months to assemble so on logistical grounds a ground campaign is not feasible until autumn 2002. The optimal times to start action are early spring
NOTE: “Eid festival” at bottom of page 7)

24 From a purely military perspective it would be very difficult to launch an invasion from Kuwait alone. Carrier-based aircraft would not be enough because of the need for land-based air-to-air refuelling. T be confident of success, bases either in Jordan or in Saudi Arabia would be required. However, a wider and durable international coalition would be advantageous for both military and political reasons. Securing moderate Arab support would be greatly assisted by the promise of a quick and decisive campaign, and credible action by the US to address the MEPP.

25 The risks include US and others military casualties. Any coalition would need much tending over the difficult months of preparation for an actual invasion. Iran, fearing further US encirclement and that it will be invaded next will be prickly but is likely to remain neutral. With his regime in danger, Saddam could use WMD, either before or during an invasion. Saddam could also target Israel as he did during the Gulf War. Restraining Israel will be difficult. it would try to pre-empt a WMD attack and has certainly made clear that it would retaliate. Direct Israeli military involvement in Iraq would great complicate coalition management and risk spreading conflict more widely.

26 None of the above options is mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural precursors to Option 3. All options had lead times. If an invasion is contemplated this autumn, then a decision will need to be taken in principle six months in advance. The greater investment of Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the greater the cost and the longer we would need to stay. Option 3 comes closest to guaranteeing regime change. At this stage we need to wait to see which option or combination of options may be favoured by the US government.

27 But it should be noted that even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD and build-up its conventional forces, so long as Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional armouries.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

28 A full opinion should be sought from the Law Officers if the above options are developed further. But in summary CONTAINMENT generally involves the implementation of existing UNSCRs and has a firm legal foundation. Of itself, REGIME CHANGE has no basis in international law. A separate note by FCO Legal Advisors setting out the general legal background and the obligations in the relevant UN Resolutions is attached.

29 In the judgement of the JIC there is no recent evidence of Iraq complicity with international terrorism. There is therefore no justification for action against Iraq based on action in self-defence (Article 51) to combat imminent threats of terrorism as in Afghanistan. However, Article 51 would come into play if Iraq were about to attack a neighbour.

30 Currently, offensive military action against Iraq can only be justified if Iraq is held to be in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire resolution, 687. 687 imposed obligations on Iraq with regard to the elimination of WMD and monitoring these obligations. But 687 never terminated the authority to use force mandated in UNSCR 678 (1990). Thus a violation of 687 can revive the [sic] authorisation to use force in 678.
31 As the ceasefire was proclaimed by the Security Council in 687, it is for the Council to decide whether a breach of obligations has occurred. There is a precedent, UNSCR 1205 (1998), passed after the expulsion of the UN inspectors, stated that in doing so Iraq had acted in flagrant violation of its obligations under 687. In our view, this revived the authority for the use of force under 678 and underpin ned Operation Dessert Fox. In contrast to general legal opinion, the US assets the right of individual Member States to determine whether Iraq has breached 687, regardless of whether the Council has reached this assessment.

32 For the P5 and the majority of the Council to take the view that Iraq was in breach of 687:
* they would need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of its obligations regarding WMD, and ballistic missiles. Such proof would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale activity. Current intelligence is insufficiently robus [sic] to meet this criterion. Even with overriding proof China, France and Russia, in particular, would need considerable lobbying to approve or acquiesce ina new resolution authorising military action against Iraq. Concessions in other policy areas might be needed. However, many Western states, at lest, would not wish to oppose the US on such a major issue; or
* if P5 unity could be obtained, Iraq refused to readmit UN inspectors after a clear ultimatum by the UN Security Council; or
* the UN inspectors were re-admitted to Iraq and found sufficient evidence of WMD activity or were again expelled trying to do so.

CONCLUSION

33 In sum, despite the considerable difficulties, the use of overridng force in a ground campaign is the only option that we can be confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international community.

34 To launch such a campaign would require a staged approach:
* winding up the pressure: increasing the pressure on Saddam through tougher containment. Stricter implementation of sanctions and a military build-up will frighten his regime. A refusal to admit N inspectors, or their admission and subsequent likely frustration, which resulted in an appropriate finding by the Security Council could provide the justification for military action. Saddam would try to prevent this, although he has miscalculated beofre [sic];
* careful planning: detailed military planning on the various invasion and basing options, and when appropriate force deployment;
* coalition building: diplomatic work to establish an international coalition to provide the broadest political and military support to a ground campaign. This will need to focus on China, France and particularly Russia who have the ability to block action in the UN Security Council and on the other Europeans. Special attention will need to be paid to moderate Arab states and to Iran;
* incentives: as an incentive guarantees will need to be made with regard to Iraqi territorial integrity. Plans should be worked up in advance of the great benefits the international community could provide for a post-Saddam Iraq and its people. These should be published.
* tackling other regional issues: an effort to engage the US in a serious effort to re-energise the MEPP would greatly assist coalition building; and
*sensitising the public: a media campaign to warm of the dangers that Saddam poses and to prepare public opinion both in the UK and abroad.

35 The US should be encouraged to consult widely on its plans.

OVERSEAS AND DEFENCE SECRETARIAT
CABINET OFFICE
8 MARCH “))” [sic]



SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

[end text - emphasis added]

In closing, the seeds for the foundation of Congressman Kucinich's call for the impeachment of George W. Bush, are here. Senator Obama does not support this call and neither does Speaker Pelosi. But I favor Dennis' going ahead with this because we're going to find out a lot as an American people that we should have known all along.

CNN's Jessica Yellin Blames ABC News Execs For "Fixing" President Bush Coverage

One major casualty of the release of the book by former White House Press Secretary Scott McCllellan was the White House Press Corp and ABC News (so far).

CNN's Jessica Yellin, who was employed by CNN during the initial years of the Iraq War, dropped a bomb of her own on CNN's Anderson Cooper 360, when she revealed that her news was "fixed" -- my term -- by ABC News execs, who killed negative Bush stories and generally made her feel pressured to make positive stories about President Bush while his approval ratings were high.

Yellin says so in this video:



Charlie Gibson, the host of Good Morning America, essentially but unknowingly confirmed Yellin when he said this:

I think the questions were asked. I respectfully disagree with the gentle lady from the Columbia Broadcasting System [group giggles]. I think the questions were asked. . . . I can remember getting in trouble with administration officials for asking questions they didn't feel comfortable with.
It was just a drumbeat of support from the administration. And it is not our job to debate them; it's our job to ask the questions.

This bit of a revelation is damaging to the overall credibility of the mainstream media and calls into question the state of American Media. It may very well be that we've been the victims of fixed news coverage all along and are entering a new era of telling the actual story via new media. But for the present I think Yellin's revelations are stunning and I'm not sure what the fallout will be, but I do think the FCC should look into this ASAP. It seems Noam Chomsky was right after all.

Caleb Campbell Forgoes Iraq For NFL's Detroit Lions - Video

In the 7th Round of the 2008 NFL Draft a huge cheer erupted from the small-compared-to-Day-One crowd and it was for a little-known cadet who also played football for Army. Caleb Campbell, who was drafted by the Detroit Lions in that last round. As that happened I talked to Dr. Bill Chackhes who gave me the details on Campbell's story. Caleb basically deferred going to Iraq as a officer after he is to graduate with the current Army class of 2008. The Army is allowing him to play in the NFL.

Everyone was enthusiastic to meet the man Bill called "The All American Boy" and this video captures that moment:

Respect our veterans, let them VOTE!

Today marks the fifth anniversary of the start of the War in Iraq. More Americans have now died in Iraq that were killed by the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September, 2001. Countless more have been injured, both physically and psychologically, yet the Veterans Administration continues to dis-serve those who they are chartered expressly to aid. They don't even want to help Veterans register to vote. Something is very wrong.

The VA, as a federal agency, has the discretion under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, (the so-called Motor Voter Law) to determine if it would serve as a voter registration agency, according to election law experts. The NVRA mandated that state agencies from motor vehicle departments to welfare offices offer people the chance to register to vote, while federal agencies such as the VA can opt to register voters. Why does the VA continue to function as an impediment to our veterans on issues from disability payments to voter registration?

"Keeping faith with those who serve must always be a core American value and a cornerstone of American patriotism. Because America's commitment to its servicemen and women begins at enlistment, and it must never end."

— Barack Obama,
Speech in Kansas City, MO,
August 21, 2007

There are currently more than 400,000 claims pending with the Veterans Benefits Administration. You would be staggered to learn the error rates in processing these claims. The Walter Reed fiasco showed that we don't always provide returning service members, coming home with record levels of combat stress, the services they've earned, and until Senator Barack Obama stepped in we were expecting them to pay for their own meals as in-patients.

Barack Obama believes America has a sacred trust with our veterans. He is committed to creating a 21st Century Department of Veterans' Affairs that provides the care and benefits our nation�s veterans deserve. He is explicitly intent on mental health treatment for troops and veterans suffering from combat-related psychological injuries.

From the benefits bureaucracy to the refusal to provide transition services and help homeless veterans with such basic rights as access to psychological treatment and registration to vote, the Veterans Administration is in a shambles. The time for change is now.

A March 6th letter from Senators Feinstein and Kerry to James B. Peake, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, stated, "Nearly one year ago, your predecessor, Secretary Nicholson, was questioned about the lack of access to nonpartisan voter registration services for our nation's veterans. A response to this inquiry was never received."

The letter also noted that "despite this lack of response, we now understand that the VA has engaged in litigation against voter registration efforts by third-party groups in VA facilities. In light of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decision that voter registration groups are not allowed to register veterans, we strongly urge you to focus on what the VA can do to ensure all veterans have access to registration."

This is unacceptable. The time for change at the VA is now. We need a new sense of urgency. Barack Obama has a record of acting to help veterans as a member of the Veterans' Affairs committee, he understands TBIs and PTSD, and he has a plan ready to go.

Respect, courtesy, and support are not too much to expect. Join Veterans for Obama.

Montel: Talk About Troups Who Died & Heath Ledger

This is a great moment captured for YouTube. Montel Williams of the Montel show is a guest on Fox News to talk about Heath Ledger and his new book, but he throws Fox a curve by asking that they not talk about Heath Ledger and instead mention the Iraq War soldier who passed on the day before after being killed by a suicide bomber. Montel said that we've lost 28 American solidiers this year already -- that's more than one for each day of the month. Are we becoming too used to this? I'm not, but it seems Fox News is. Watch this video:

Hillary Clinton On Meet The Press Tells Lies: Video

The video title itself is tame, but after seeing it again, I think "tells lies" is more appropriate. In the video, I take three issues: Martin Luther King, Gender, and The Iraq War, and show how she's not told the truth versus what she said on NBC's "Meet The Press". In the matter of the New York Times article on her support of the 2002 Iraq War Resolution, here's the article I referenced below and with this link. I'll add more to this aricle soon.

On Wearing My "Obama 08" Cap and News Media Thoughts

I made this quick video while in the Denver Airport on the way to Atlanta. I am reporting on wearing my Obama 08 Cap and some observations on how the media mis-portrays America.

Ron Paul - Republican - Will Not Support The Republican Nominee Because Of Iraq War

Congressman Ron Paul said that he will not support the GOP nominee for the Presidential election because of the Republican Party's stance on the Iraq War.

Congresswoman Barbara Lee “Lone Iraq No Vote” Fundraising Event - Sunday, September 23, 2007

Please Join Hosts
Steve Phillips & Susan Sandler,
Gene Eidenberg & Anna Chavez, Elizabeth Colton,
Zenophon Abraham, Ed Penhoet,
Wayne Jordan & Quinn Delaney,
Hari Dillon, John Gooding and Miguel Bustos

In honor of
Congresswoman Barbara Lee
And the 6th Anniversary of the “Lone Vote”

On September 14, 2001, Rep. Barbara Lee was the only member of Congress to vote against a resolution that gave President George Bush a blank check to go to war without constraint. Bush used this resolution to launch his “global war on terror.” Since then, she has led the effort to prevent – and now to end – the War in Iraq. We are proud of her leadership and urge you to join us in honoring her.

At the home of
Steve Phillips and Susan Sandler
553 Arkansas Street
San Francisco

NEW DATE!
Sunday, September 23, 2007
6:00 pm until 8:00 pm

$2,300 Champion • $1,000 Host
(Includes a signed copy of the Lone Vote speech)
$500 Partner • $250 Friend

RSVP by contacting Mitchell Lester at 415-308-5849 or Maria Ali at 510-663-1207 or maria@leeforcongress.com.Valet parking will be available.


Congresswoman Barbara Lee

September 14, 2001

Mr. Speaker, Members, I rise today really with a very heavy heart, one that is filled with sorrow for the families and the loved ones who were killed and injured this week. Only the most foolish and the most callous would not understand the grief that has really gripped our people and millions across the world. This unspeakable act on the United States has really -- really forced me, however, to rely on my moral compass, my conscience, and my God for direction.

September 11th changed the world. Our deepest fears now haunt us. Yet, I am convinced that military action will not prevent further acts of international terrorism against the United States. This is a very complex and complicated matter.
Now this resolution will pass, although we all know that the President can wage a war even without it. However difficult this vote may be, some of us must urge the use of restraint. Our country is in a state of mourning. Some of us must say, let's step back for a moment. Let's just pause, just for a minute and think through the implications of our actions today, so that this does not spiral out of control.

Now I have agonized over this vote. But I came to grips with it today, and I came to grips with opposing this resolution during the very painful, yet very beautiful memorial service. As a member of the clergy so eloquently said, "As we act, let us not become the evil that we deplore."

Congresswoman Barbara Lee

Barbara Lee was first elected to represent California's ninth Congressional District in 1998. On September 14th, 2001 Barbara Lee courageously cast the lone vote against granting the President a blank check to wage war without constraint. She is currently on the Appropriations Committee – bringing her bold voice and progressive agenda to the powerful spending committee. Congresswoman Lee also serves as the First Vice Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, and the co-Chair of the Progressive Caucus.




Lone Vote Event — September 23, 2007

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Video - MoveOn.Org Accuses President Bush Of Betrayal Of Trust

This video's the latest missile MoveOn.org has fired at the Bush Administration regarding the Iraq War.

General Petraeus Opening Statement - IRAQ Hearings

Senator Hillary Clinton Questions General Petraeus - IRAQ Hearings

Senator Barack Obama Questions General Petraeus - IRAQ Hearings