"Meet The Press" Tim Russert Dies Of A Heart Attack At 58
One of the main reasons I was so excited about attending the 2008 Democratic Convention was that I would get to meet Tim Russert, the ever-present host of the legendary show and one of my favorites, Meet The Press.
Now, I will not, because Tim Russert died of what the New York Post called an apparent heart attack today at 58 years of age.
I never met or knew Tim, but he felt like part of the American Cultural furniture and I always appreciated his on-air professionalism. In a world of "vetters", Russert was the vetter. No poitician was considered complete until they faced a grilling from Russert. Barack Obama's best presentations were on Meet The Press because he handled himself with grace and intelligence under Russerts withering line of questions.
But we always saw Russert as the person who sat as judge and jury in politics. Always fair. Always smart. Always informative. Always professional. It's no wonder Time Magazine named him one of the world's 100 most influential people this year. .
Tim Russert represented the best in media and I will miss him.
Here's Russert recently interviewing former Bush Press Secretary Scott McClellan.
I met with Oakland's elected City Attorney and my friend John Russo the day after election day to talk about his unopposed win for a third term, how Oakland has changed, Oakland Politics and the District Three Council race, who Senator Obama should pick as his VP, what Russo's is proudest of with the evolution of his office, and the talks between the City of Oakland and the Oakland Raiders.
Russo explains that the talks are between the Raiders and the Oakland / Alameda County Joint Powers Authority and that they're going well. He also confirmed that Raiders Manager of The General Partner Al Davis is not in good health and has not attended all of the meeting. As to the possibility that the Raiders would get a new stadium, he said no, but they're in agreement on the matters of concern to the Raiders.
Given what I know from trying to bring the 2005 Super Bowl to Oakland (we lost to Jacksonville), that means we should expect to see an upgraded Coliseum at some point in the future.
What was surprising news was that the Raiders were the party that initiated the talks, and not the City of Oakland or The County of Alameda. I personally feel that's a signal of the Raiders new willingness to work with the City and stay in Oakland.
Also, we talk about why he ran unopposed and how Oakland's political landscape has changed.
Yesterday, the Constitution won. In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court said that prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay have the right to have their cases heard in US courts, granting them the writ of habeas corpus. Writing for the majority in Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Anthony Kennedy said, "Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law. The Framers decided that habeas corpus, a right of first importance, must be a part of that framework, a part of that law."
President Bush was none too happy with the decision, saying, while on a trip in Italy, "First of all it's a Supreme Court decision. We will abide by the court's decision. It was a deeply divided court and I strongly agree with those who dissented. The dissent was based upon those serious concerns about U.S. national security. Congress and the administration worked very carefully on ... a piece of legislation that set the appropriate procedures in place as to how to deal with the detainees." He went on to say that his Administration would study the ruling, " ... with this in mind, to determine whether or not additional legislation might be appropriate so we can safely say to the American people: 'We're doing everything we can to protect you.'"
I am not surprised at all that Bush is pissed. It's hard to keep your citizens under the blanket of fear when the courts expose the "enemies," like Omad Khadr, to the light of day. But it's a huge victory for America when the Court allows the rest of world to see that our system of checks and balances can, even at the last stop, prevail. The Constitution was bruised and battered along its way through, being hit hard by both the executive and legislative branches. It then was dealt near death blows by the courts along its way to the highest court in the land. But the highest court saved it and proved that our system does, indeed, work. This was a victory not only for the Constitution, but for the framework of our government detailed therein.
Writing for the opposition and speaking from the bench about his opposition, Justice Antonin Scalia said that the decision "... will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed." I'm not sure how. These prisoners have been held at Gitmo for years. Were any of them truly guilty, their fellow combatants would not get the message from this ruling that they could get caught, extradited to the US, have a short, easy confinement, get a fair day in a lenient US court, be set free, and return to the battlefield. That's just not the way it works and not the way it will be seen in the world. The message it does send the world, however, is that we are finally taking our role as human rights leaders seriously.
To read the Opinion and the Dissent for yourself, go here: FindLaw.com
In the latest example of Jumping The Shark, The National Press Club, once a place for leaders to meet the press, lowers itself to less-than-curb-level and into the garbage, giving a platform to Larry Sinclair, a person who lives in Texas but lied about it, has lied about his association with Senator Obama, took a lie detector test, FAILED IT, and yet is still being given a platform by the NPC.
Now that's nuts. Sign the FiredogLake petition here.
Calll the NPC and ask for the President at 202-662-7500 now!
Ok. That's how I feel. Hey, I love Sex and The City for a lot of reasons. I've just not seen the movie yet. Why? I don't know. But I do feel lame for having not seen the movie. At any rate, here's a great video on the movie, complete with scenes:
I just saw this article in the New York Times reporting on how Canadians crack down on the use of "hate speech" that's commonly heard in the United States.
Does that mean we're less advanced as a society? I think not. My personal view is that while I totally hate any kind of "hate speech", hearing it in a digital society gives us a true view of our country and causes others to put pressure on the "haters" to stop what they're doing. http://www.blogger.com/img/gl.link.gif For example, I remember when a certain NY Times writer confused me as being two different Black men in consecutive columns. Valleywag picked up on that, and the racism that was evident.
The result was an apology from the writer.
Besides, we would not know how stupid Michelle Malkin could be without free speech!
It’s become fashionable for GOP surrogates to smear and try to irk Mrs. Obama, but with all the effort going in to finding mud to fling at her it’s stunning that FOX would support such an overt, transparent lie so close on the heels of the terrorist fist jab fiasco. Make no mistake, the network supported it as part of their ongoing hunt for ratings, which in turn determines how much you charge your advertisers.
But will SNUGGLE and other advertisers want to be affiliated with bashing married moms? Is that consistent with Snuggle's cuddly-bear image: funding slanderous attack ads? Tell SNUGGLE what you think; let them know you're going to use other products if they continue to advertise on a mean network that pretends to present fair and balanced news.
Want to be amazed at just how overtly racist and sexist Fox News can be? Go to Daily Kos and check out this post: Fox Smears Michelle Obama with Sexist/Racist Slur. You'll get the breakdown and the screenshot, which I won't reproduce here out of respect for their having it first. What I will do is share the caption they showed, with Michelle Malkin hosting, under Michelle Obama on screen:
"Outraged Liberals: Stop Picking On Obama's Baby Mama!"
Are you kidding me? Even for Fox Noise, this is dipping way deep into the racist and sexist pit. If you're as offended as I, write to Fox (yourcomments@foxnews.com) and to the FCC to register your disgust.
"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justifi ed by the conjunction of ter- rorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fi xed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record."
That was from my blog dated June 5, 2005 -- three years ago. I thought that was shocking then, but what's even more disturbing is the totally retarded view of people like Fox News Bill O'Reilly, who says that it doens't matter how we got into war, we're winning it!
That's so stupid it's mental. Really. It is. I'm not going to waste time on Bill here. At least more than I already have done.
The main point is that the first paragraph forms the basis for the explaination of actions by President Bush since 2002 that have resulted in a 35-count call for impeachment by Congressman Dennis Kucinich. Many have looked at his case, including Beth Holzman at the Huff Post, who writes..
Some will want to dismiss Rep. Dennis Kucinich's introduction of articles of impeachment against President Bush as quixotic, but it's not. Twenty House Republicans joined nearly all House Democrats in voting to send the articles to the Judiciary Committee. This comes on the heels of the Senate Intelligence Committee's 107-page report confirming, with the vote of two Republican Senators, that President Bush abused his office by deceiving Congress and the American people into the Iraq war. Although Kucinich's articles included other impeachment grounds as well, deception about the war is arguably the most serious one.
And a forgotten one.
The Downing Street Memo was the smoking gun in 2005, and it still is today. In fact, the memo that pointed to the U.S. desire to circumvent the United Nations and fashion a case for war, is actually several memos. Moreover, I vividly remember that when this issue of the Downing Street Memo came up, the mainstream media all but swept it under the rug.
This includes the same White House Press Corp that now is upset with President Bush's former Press Secretary Scott McClellan's new book which also reveals a strategy to cover up and form a bogus intelligence argument for going to war. The same one such that CNN's Jessica Yellin said that when she worked for ABC, she was "forced" to make reports that were favorable to the Bush Administration. And the same White House Press Corp which has Fox News reporters who Rupert Murdock admitted at the Davos Forum, were part of Fox' effort to "sell" the war to the public -- to "follow the Bush Policy" as he says in this damaging video:
We knew then -- or Bush knew -- that there were no WMD's at all. But that was the basis for going to war in Iraq.
The main Downing Street Memo was written by Matthew Rycroft, who was at the time a Downing Street foreign policy aide as of 2006, he is the Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The memo, according to Wikipedia, was leaked to The Sunday Times on May 1, 2005.
I first learned about it reading the Drudge Report. I can't remember ABC, CBS, or NBC featuring the story on a consistent basis. It came and went. Now, it's back. Here's the first memo, read it carefully and more than once.
This second memo I've selected from the set was dated March 8, 2002 and reads the UK's view on Iraq, stating that they believed that there were "WMD's" but did not have the sound intelligence to back their claim. The memo states that the U.S. was pushing for "regime" change and felt that U.S. Containment Policy was not working. But the memo reveals that it was indeed effective and had outlines for tightening the policy.
(Supporters of Senator Obama should pay attention as the seeds for a more diplomatic approach are here. The Second Bush Administration really just wanted to use 9-11 as a reason to find and jail Saddam Hussein, in my view. But once that was done, we should have just got out and came home.
Text of the Iraq Options paper - March 8, 2002 memo from Overseas and Defence Secretariat Cabinet Office outlining military options for implementing regime change.
(to print in large text reliably, increase the text size view in your browser, the text will then print larger as well)
[begin transcription]
SECRET UK EYES ONLY
IRAQ: OPTIONS PAPER
SUMMARY
Since 1991, our objective has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbors, into the international community. Implicitly, this cannot occur with Saddam Hussein in power. As at least worst opinion, we have supported a policy of containment which has been partially successful. However:
* Despite sanctions, Iraq continues to develop WMD,. although our intelligence is poor. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened, though there is no greater threat now than in recent years that Saddam will use WMD; and * Saddam’s brutal regime remains in power and destablises the Arab and wider Islamic world.
We have two options. We could toughen the existing containment policy. This would increase the pressure on Saddanm [sic]. It would not reintegrate Iraq into the international community.
The US administration has lot faith in containment and is now considering regime change. The end states could either be a Sunni strongman or a representative government.
Tre [sic] three options for achieving regime change are:
* covert support to opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup; * air support for opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup; and * a full-scale ground campaign.
These are not mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural precursors to Option3 [sic]. the greater investment of Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the greater the cost and the longer we woul [sic] need to stay. the only certain means to remove Saddam and his elite is to invade and impose a new government. But this could involve nation building over many years. Even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD and build-up its conventional forces, so long a Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional armouries and there was no acceptable solution to Palestinian grievances.
A legal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers advice, non currently exists. This makes moving quickly to invade legally very difficult. We should therefore consider a staged approach, establishing international support, building up pressure on Saddam and developing military plans. There is a lead time of about 6 months to a ground offensive.
CURRENT OBJECTIVES OF UK POLICY
1 Within our objectives of preserving peace and stability in the Gulf and ensuring energy security, our current objectives towards Iraq are: * the reintegration of a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess WMD or threaten its neighbours, into the international community. Implicitly this cannot occur with Saddam in power; and * hence, as the least worst option, we have supported containment of Iraq, by constraining Saddam’s ability to re-arm or build up WMD and to threaten his neighbours.
2 Subsidiary objectives are: * Preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq; * improving the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people; * protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq; *sustaining UK/UK co-operation, including, if necessary by moderating US policy; and * maintaining the credibility and authority of the Security Council.
HAS CONTAINMENT WORKED?
3 Since 1991, the policy of containment has been partially successful; * Sanctions have effectively frozen Iraq’s nuclear programme; * Iraq has been prevented from rebuilding its conventional arsenal to pre-Gulf War levels; * ballistic missile programmes have been severely restricted; Biological weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes have been hindered; * No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq have given some protection to the Kurds and the Shia. Although subject to continuing political pressure, the Kurds remain autonomous; and * Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his neighbours.
4 However: * Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, although our intelligence is poor. Iraq has up to 20 650km-range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit os 150km continues. Iraq continues with the BW and CW programmed and, if it has not already done so could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including is ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened. * Saddam leads a brutal regime, which impoverishes his people. While in power Saddam is a rallying point for anti-Western sentiment in the Arab and wider Islamic world, and as such a cause of instability; and * despite UN controls over Iraq’s oil revenue under Oil for Food, there is considerable oil and other smuggling.
5 In this context, and against the background of our desire to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq into the international community, we examine the two following policy options: * a toughening of the existing containment policy, facilitate by 11 September; and * regime change by military means: a new departure which would require the construction of a coalition and a legal justification.
TOUGHENING CONTAINMENT
6 This would consist of the following elements: * full implementation of all relevant UNSCRs, particularly 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999). We should ensure that the Good Review List (GRL) is introduced in May and that Russian holds to its promise not to block. The signs are positive but continuing pressure is needed. (The GRL focuses sanctions exclusively on preventing shipments of WMD-related and other arms, while allowing other business without scrutiny. As such, it will greatly facilitate legitimate Iraqi commerce under Oil for Food.); * encourage the US not to block discussions to clarify the modalities of Resolution 1284 once Russian agreement to the GRL has been secured. We should take a hard-line on each area for clarification - the purpose of clarification is not to lower the bar on Iraqi compliance; but * P5 and Security Council unity would facilitate a specific demand that Iraq re-admit the UN inspectors. Our aim would be to tell Saddam to admit inspectors or face the risk of military action. * push for tougher action (especially by the US) against states breaking sanctions. This should not discriminate between allies (Turkey), friends (UAE) and others (especially Syria). It would put real pressure on Saddam either to submit to meaningful inspections or to lash out; * maintain our present military posture, including in the NFZs, and be prepared to respond robustly to any Iraqi adventurism; and * continue to make clear (without overtly espousing regime change) our view that Iraq would be better off without Saddam. We could trail the rosy future for Iraq without him in a ‘Con tract with the Iraqi People’, although to be at all credible, this would need some detailed work.
7 What could it achieve: * There will be greater pressure on Saddam. The GRL will make sanctions more attractive to at least some of their detractors. Improving implementation of sanctions would reduce the regime’s illicit revenues; and * the return of UN weapons inspectors would allow greater scrutiny of Iraqi programmes and of Iraqi forces in general. If they found significant evidence of WMD, were expelled or, in face of an ultimatum, not re-admitted in the first place, then this could provide legal justification for large-scale military action (see below).
8 But: * Some of the difficulties with the existing policy still apply; those states in breach of sanctions will want compensation if they are to change ge tack; * Saddam is only likely to permit the return of inspectors if he believes the threat of large scale US military action is imminent and that such concessions would prevent the US from acting decisively. Playing for time, he would then embark on a renewed policy of non co-operation; and * although containment has held for the past decade, Iraq has progressively increased it international engagement. Even if the GRL makes sanctions more sustainable the sanctions regime could collapse in the long-term.
9 Tougher containment would not re-integrate Iraq into the international community as it offers little prospect of removing Saddam. He will continue with his WMD programmes, destabilising the ARab and Islamic world, and impoverishing his people. But there is no greater threat no that he will use WMD than there has been in recent years, so continuing containment is an option.
US VIEWS
10 The US has lost confidence in containment. Some in government want Saddam removed. The success of Operation Enduring Freedom, distrust of UN sanctions and inspection regimes, and unfinished business from 1991 are all factors. Washington believes the legal basis for an attack on Iraq already exists. Nor will it necessarily be governed by wider political factors. The US may be willing to work with a much smaller coalition than we think desirable.
REGIME CHANGE
11 In considering the options for regime change below, we need to first consider what sort of Iraq we want? There are two possibilities: * A Sunni military strongman. He would be likely to maintain Iraqi territorial integrity. Assistance with reconstruction and political rehabilitation could be traded for assurances on abandoning WMD programmes and respecting human rights, particularly of ethnic minorities. The US and other militaries could withdraw quickly. However, there would then be a strong risk of the Iraqi system reverting to type. Military coup could succeed coup until an autocratic, Sunni dictator emerged who protected Sunni interests. With time he could acquire WMD; or * a representative broadly democratic government. This would be Sunni-led but within a federal structure, the Kurds would be guaranteed autonomy and the Shia fair access to government. Such a regime would be less likely to develop WMD and threaten its neighbours. However, to survive it would require the US and others to commit to nation building for many years. This wold entail a substantial international security force and help with reconstruction
OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER: INTERNAL
12 Saddam has a strong grip on power maintained through fear and patronage. The security and intelligence apparatus, including the Republican and Special Republican Guard, who protect the regime to effectively are predominantly drawn from the Arab Sunni minority (2-25 per cent of the population); many from Tikrit like Saddam. They fear non-Sunni rule, which would bring retribution and the end of their privileges. The regime’s success in defeating the 1991 uprising stemmed from senior Sunni officers looking into the abyss of Shia rule and preserving their interests by backing Saddam. In the current circumstances, a military revolt or coup is a remote possibility.
13 Unaided, the Iraqi opposition is incapable of overthrowing the regime. The external opposition is weak, divided and lacks domestic credibility. The predominant group is the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella organisation led by Ahmad Chalabi, a Shia and convicted fraudster, popular on Capitol Hill. The other major group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), espouses moderate Arab socialism and is led by another Shia, Ayad Allawi. Neither group has a military capability and both are badly penetrated by Iraqi intelligence. In 1996, a CIA attempt to stir opposition groups ended in wholesale executions. Most Iraqis see the INC/INA as Western stooges.
14 The internal opposition is small and fractured on ethnic and sectarian grounds. There is no effective Sunni Arab opposition. There are 3-4m in northern Iraq. Most live in Kurdish Autonomous Zone, established in 1991. The Kurds deploy at least 40,000 lightly armed militia but are divided between two main parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). These groups have an interest in preserving the status quo and are more interested in seeking advantage over the other than allying against Saddam. Divide and rule is easy; in 196 the KDP assisted the Iraqi Army’s expulsion of the PUK and Iraqi opposition groups from Irbil.
15 The Kurds do not co-operate with the Shia Arabs who form 60 per cent of the population. The main Shia opposition group is the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), with 3-5,000 fighters, but it is tainted by Iranian support. Most Shia would like to have a greater say in Iraqi government, but not necessarily control: they do no want secession, Islamic autonomy or Iranian influence.
REGIONAL
16 Iraq’s neighbours have a direct interest in the country’s affairs. Iran and Turkey, in particular, are wary of US influence and oppose some opposition groups. Turkey, conscious of its own restive Kurdish minority, will do anything to prevent the establishment of a independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, including intervention. Iran, also with a Kurdish minority, would also oppose a Kurdish state and is keen to protect the rights of its co-religionists in the south (see FCO paper on P5, European and regional view of possible military action against Iraq, attached.)
17 We have looked at three options for achieving regime change (we dismissed assassination of Saddam Hussein as an option because it would be illegal):
OPTION 1: COVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS
18 The aim would be to bring down the regime byinternal [sic] revolt, aided by the defection or at least acquiescence of large sections of the Army. A group of Sunni generals probably from within the Republican Guard, might depose Saddam if they decided the alternative was defeat. This option could be pursued by providing covert intelligence, large scale financial and Special Forces support to opposition groups. The Kurds would be persuaded to unite and attack into northern Iraq, tying down some Iraqi forces. Simultaneously, in a greater threat to the regime, the Shia would rise up in the southern cities, and in Baghdad.
19 This option also has a very low prospect of success on its own. The external opposition is no strong enough to overthrow Saddam and would be rejected by most Iraqis as a replacement government. The Kurds could only mount a very limited offensive in the north. Mass uprisings in the south would be unlikely. The US failure to support the 1991 uprising remains vivid. The Republican Guard would move against any opposition and any wavering regular Army units. There would also be a high risk of US/coalition forces being captured. The remaining elements of opposition could be eliminated, buttressing Saddam and his reputation as Arab folk hero. On the other hand, this option has never been pursued in a concerted, single-minded way before and should not be dismissed, at least as a possible precursor to Options 2 and 3.
OPTION 2: AN AIR CAMPAIGN PROVIDING OVERT SUPPORT TO OPPOSITION GROUPS LEADING TO A COUP OR UPRISING
20 The aim would be to assist an internal revolt by providing strategic and tactical air support for opposition groups to move against the regime. Such support would disable Saddam’s military and security apparatus. Suspected WMD facilities would also be targeted. Substantial numbers of aircraft and munitions would need to be built up in threatre over a period of months. Any campaign would take several weeks at least probably several months. Pressure on the regime could be increased by massing ground and naval forces and threatening a land invasion.
21 This option has no guarantee of success. The build up of pressure might persuade other Sunnis to overthrow Saddam and his family, but there is no guarantee that another Sunni autocrat would be better. Comparisons with Afghanistan are misleading. Saddam’s military and security apparatus is considerable more potent and cohesive. We are not aware of any Karzai figure able to command respect inside and outside Iraq. Arab states would only back the plan if they were sure Saddam would be deposed. At least the co-operation of Kuwait would be needed for the necessary military build-up. The Arab street would oppose an air attack against Iraq, but visibility of a popular uprising could calm Arab public opinion.
OPTION 3: A GROUND CAMPAIGN
22 The aim would be to launch a full-scale ground offensive to destroy Saddam]s [sic] military machine and remove him from power. A pro-Western regime would be installed which would destroy Iraq’s WMD capability, make peace with Iraq’s neighbours and give rights to all Iraqis, including ethnic minorities. As in the Gulf War, this would need to be preceded by a major air-offensive to soften up defences.
23 US contingency planning prior to 11 September indicated that such a ground campaign would require 200-400,000 troops. The numbers would be roughly half those of 1991 because Iraqi forces are now considerably weaker. Any invasion force would need to pose a credible threat to Baghdad in order to persuade members of the Sunni military elite that their survival was better served by deserting to the coalition than staying loyal to Saddam. Sufficient air assets would need three months and ground forces at least four-five months to assemble so on logistical grounds a ground campaign is not feasible until autumn 2002. The optimal times to start action are early spring NOTE: “Eid festival” at bottom of page 7)
24 From a purely military perspective it would be very difficult to launch an invasion from Kuwait alone. Carrier-based aircraft would not be enough because of the need for land-based air-to-air refuelling. T be confident of success, bases either in Jordan or in Saudi Arabia would be required. However, a wider and durable international coalition would be advantageous for both military and political reasons. Securing moderate Arab support would be greatly assisted by the promise of a quick and decisive campaign, and credible action by the US to address the MEPP.
25 The risks include US and others military casualties. Any coalition would need much tending over the difficult months of preparation for an actual invasion. Iran, fearing further US encirclement and that it will be invaded next will be prickly but is likely to remain neutral. With his regime in danger, Saddam could use WMD, either before or during an invasion. Saddam could also target Israel as he did during the Gulf War. Restraining Israel will be difficult. it would try to pre-empt a WMD attack and has certainly made clear that it would retaliate. Direct Israeli military involvement in Iraq would great complicate coalition management and risk spreading conflict more widely.
26 None of the above options is mutually exclusive. Options 1 and/or 2 would be natural precursors to Option 3. All options had lead times. If an invasion is contemplated this autumn, then a decision will need to be taken in principle six months in advance. The greater investment of Western forces, the greater our control over Iraq’s future, but the greater the cost and the longer we would need to stay. Option 3 comes closest to guaranteeing regime change. At this stage we need to wait to see which option or combination of options may be favoured by the US government.
27 But it should be noted that even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD and build-up its conventional forces, so long as Iran and Israel retain their WMD and conventional armouries.
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
28 A full opinion should be sought from the Law Officers if the above options are developed further. But in summary CONTAINMENT generally involves the implementation of existing UNSCRs and has a firm legal foundation. Of itself, REGIME CHANGE has no basis in international law. A separate note by FCO Legal Advisors setting out the general legal background and the obligations in the relevant UN Resolutions is attached.
29 In the judgement of the JIC there is no recent evidence of Iraq complicity with international terrorism. There is therefore no justification for action against Iraq based on action in self-defence (Article 51) to combat imminent threats of terrorism as in Afghanistan. However, Article 51 would come into play if Iraq were about to attack a neighbour.
30 Currently, offensive military action against Iraq can only be justified if Iraq is held to be in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire resolution, 687. 687 imposed obligations on Iraq with regard to the elimination of WMD and monitoring these obligations. But 687 never terminated the authority to use force mandated in UNSCR 678 (1990). Thus a violation of 687 can revive the [sic] authorisation to use force in 678. 31 As the ceasefire was proclaimed by the Security Council in 687, it is for the Council to decide whether a breach of obligations has occurred. There is a precedent, UNSCR 1205 (1998), passed after the expulsion of the UN inspectors, stated that in doing so Iraq had acted in flagrant violation of its obligations under 687. In our view, this revived the authority for the use of force under 678 and underpin ned Operation Dessert Fox. In contrast to general legal opinion, the US assets the right of individual Member States to determine whether Iraq has breached 687, regardless of whether the Council has reached this assessment.
32 For the P5 and the majority of the Council to take the view that Iraq was in breach of 687: * they would need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of its obligations regarding WMD, and ballistic missiles. Such proof would need to be incontrovertible and of large-scale activity. Current intelligence is insufficiently robus [sic] to meet this criterion. Even with overriding proof China, France and Russia, in particular, would need considerable lobbying to approve or acquiesce ina new resolution authorising military action against Iraq. Concessions in other policy areas might be needed. However, many Western states, at lest, would not wish to oppose the US on such a major issue; or * if P5 unity could be obtained, Iraq refused to readmit UN inspectors after a clear ultimatum by the UN Security Council; or * the UN inspectors were re-admitted to Iraq and found sufficient evidence of WMD activity or were again expelled trying to do so.
CONCLUSION
33 In sum, despite the considerable difficulties, the use of overridng force in a ground campaign is the only option that we can be confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international community.
34 To launch such a campaign would require a staged approach: * winding up the pressure: increasing the pressure on Saddam through tougher containment. Stricter implementation of sanctions and a military build-up will frighten his regime. A refusal to admit N inspectors, or their admission and subsequent likely frustration, which resulted in an appropriate finding by the Security Council could provide the justification for military action. Saddam would try to prevent this, although he has miscalculated beofre [sic]; * careful planning: detailed military planning on the various invasion and basing options, and when appropriate force deployment; * coalition building: diplomatic work to establish an international coalition to provide the broadest political and military support to a ground campaign. This will need to focus on China, France and particularly Russia who have the ability to block action in the UN Security Council and on the other Europeans. Special attention will need to be paid to moderate Arab states and to Iran; * incentives: as an incentive guarantees will need to be made with regard to Iraqi territorial integrity. Plans should be worked up in advance of the great benefits the international community could provide for a post-Saddam Iraq and its people. These should be published. * tackling other regional issues: an effort to engage the US in a serious effort to re-energise the MEPP would greatly assist coalition building; and *sensitising the public: a media campaign to warm of the dangers that Saddam poses and to prepare public opinion both in the UK and abroad.
35 The US should be encouraged to consult widely on its plans.
OVERSEAS AND DEFENCE SECRETARIAT CABINET OFFICE 8 MARCH “))” [sic]
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY
DAVID MANNING From: Matthew Rycroft Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
[end text - emphasis added]
In closing, the seeds for the foundation of Congressman Kucinich's call for the impeachment of George W. Bush, are here. Senator Obama does not support this call and neither does Speaker Pelosi. But I favor Dennis' going ahead with this because we're going to find out a lot as an American people that we should have known all along.
As some of you know, I'm a YouTube partner, so as a daily viewer and user of YouTube, I've got a good idea of what videos get seen and which ones do not. But I've got to admit I've never seen anyone just game the system like AtheneWins does.
Who's AtheneWins? Well, I don't have a bio on him but his MySpace Page reads that he's an English speaking, smark-alec 28-year-old Belgian man who really talks about what he's doing in his videos and what fans are saying about him.
That's it. Nothing else.
Well, ok he does have videos like "How to get a horny bitch" which was banned by YouTube staff, he says. I write that because Athene spends all of the video time talking about what he's going to do in bed. Well, ok, most of the time. Then he has a nice looking brunette next to him that he uses as a kind of model that he fondles on, on camera.
This segment is done in the middle of the video, where YouTube's automatic thumbnail posting system picks up her breasts and so that's what we see and people click to see the rest of the video, thus generating -- traffic.
But his latest video has none of that.
It's just him talking on and on and on, and the vid's more than seven minutes long.
Still, with all that, it's generated almost a million views and seems to be stuck on the top of the most viewed videos page for this entire week!
Marketers could take a lesson from Athene and win.
We each receive emails and visit websites that are very anti-Senator Obama. Below is an email you can use to refute the negative and put these people on the side of Change.
I caucused in Iowa and because of that effort, and the effort of other Iowan's supporting Senator Obama, his road to the White House began. This is a man I believe in and believe that he may not be able to "Change" all that he wants, but his positive attitude, professional demeanor and honorable character will strengthen our country. Please feel free to use this (below) to help grow and strengthen Senator Obama's election campaign:
Your future, our future depends on the upcoming Presidential election.I understand your concerns over Presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama and your need to feel you must support a candidate other than Senator Obama.
The road to the White House is long and arduous but can be made easier by a unified Democratic party.If we are divided amongst ourselves our future is in peril.We are one in the same – democrats, republicans and independents.We all want a stronger America, a renewed face in the eyes of the world of leadership, compassion and fairness.A new direction.We are all united in the fact that we did not receive this under President Bush’s administration.
There are rumors about Senator Obama’s past.I urge you to check each rumor out – there are several sites which are excellent sources:
I truly believe Senator Obama offers a path to unity, truth, a strong democratic party and a new direction for the United States.Please come join us and help stop the division.United We Stand, Divided we Fail.I invite you a visit our web site at http://www.barackobama.com and help reshape the future.
Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo Supporter of Senator John McCain
Ok, so Senator John McCain has tried to hammer Barack Obama today for having Washington Legend Jim Johnson on a team assembled to find a VP candidate for Senator Barack Obama, when as it turns out, Johnson got a mortgage loan from Countrywide Financial and a good one reportedly due to his relationship with the CEO Angelo Mozilo.
Of course, that has nothing to do with the campaign or Barack Obama. Yet, the McCain staffers and McCain have pounced on this bit of news and Senator Obama accepted Johnson's resignation today.
Well, I guess that means Senator John McCain should give back the $1,000 Angelo Mozilo gave to him. That's right. Angelo Mozilo, the CEO of Countrywide Financial, is a supporter of John McCain and gives money only to Republican candidates.
I found this news about Mozillo over at Newsmeat.com.
It seems that Mozillo has given to first Rudy Giuliani, then Elton Gallegy, who was running for Congress, and Mary Bono. He lives in Westlake Village, CA. Mozillo has not given, nor the Barack Obama seek, a donation.
So while Barack Obama has no connection to the head of the firm under Federal investigation in the subprime lending controversy, John McCain does. McCain was also one of the focal points of the Keating Five Scandal.
But will SNUGGLE and other advertisers want to be affiliated with bashing married moms? Is that consistent with Snuggle's cuddly-bear image: funding slanderous attack ads? 
